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NOTE
DETERMINING THE EFFECT OF
INFLATION ON LOST FUTURE
EARNINGS: WHAT PRICE EQUITY?
One of the most deeply entrenched principles of tort law is
that compensatory damages are awarded to make an injured party
whole.1 This rule, however, is far easier to state than to apply. As-
suming that adequate compensation can be made, determining the
cash value necessary to compensate a person for loss of a limb, or a
family for loss of its principal wage earner, can be problematic.2
Certain elements of damage, such as accrued medical expenses, can
be translated easily into a cash award. Other elements, however,
such as future expenses,3 pose numerous valuation problems due to
the rule that the plaintiff be awarded lump-sum compensation at
the time of judgment for all past, present, and future injuries at-
tributable to the defendant's tortious act.4
1 E.g., 1 T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 29, at 24 (1912).
Concerning the assessment of damages, the Supreme Court, in 1800, declared that "it is a
rational, and a legal principle, that the compensation should be equivalent to the injury."
Bussy v. Donaldson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 206, 207 (1800); see Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Arms,
91 U.S. 489, 493 (1875); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 293 (5th Cir.
1970). For a general discussion of the historical origins of the compensation principle, see C.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 5, at 21-24 (1935); 1 T. SEDGWICK, supra,
§§ 7-29, at 5-25; J. STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY: PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH ACTIONS §
3, at 2-4 (1972).
1 See Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO
ST. L.J. 158, 160 (1958); Peck & Hopkins, Economics and Impaired Earning Capacity in
Personal Injury Cases, 44 WASH. L. REV. 351, 351 (1969).
3 A plaintiff so severely injured as to be unable to regain employment may face several
types of future expenses. For example, the type of injury suffered may require ongoing med-
ical treatment or other types of care. See, e.g., Schnebly v. Baker, 217 N.W.2d 708, 724-25
(Iowa 1974); Cords v. Anderson, 80 Wis. 2d 525, 549 & n.6, 259 N.W.2d 672, 683 & n.6
(1977). For general information on the law pertaining to future medical expenses, see J.
STEIN, supra note 1, § 95, at 152-57. Additionally, damages for future pain and suffering
generally are available to a plaintiff if a reasonable probability of continued pain and suffer-
ing can be shown. See generally id. § 15, at 24.
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 910 (1979). According to the Restatement, "the
situation as it appears at the time of trial is determinative" of the amount of damages. Id.
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One of the most significant elements in personal injury and
wrongful death recoveries is loss of future earning capacity.5 A
proper award to compensate for lost earning capacity is lost future
earnings-the salary the plaintiff would have received had he con-
tinued to work until his natural death or retirement.6 During a
plaintiff's working life, however, several factors may affect the size
of his annual salary.7 Among these factors is future inflation.8
comment b; see, e.g., J. STEIN, supra note 1, § 169, at 327.
5 E.g., In re United States Steel Corp., 436 F.2d 1256, 1272-74 (6th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971); 1 S. SPEISsR, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 3:5, at 136-38
(2d ed. 1975); Crosby, Impact of Inflation and Income Taxes on Future Damages in Per-
sonal Injury and Death Cases, 12 FORUM 542, 542-43 (1977).
6 J. STEIN, supra note 1, § 64, at 103-04. In wrongful death actions, an award of dam-
ages is meant to serve one of two functions, depending on the nature of the enabling statute.
1 S. SPEISER, supra note 5, § 3:6, at 140 & n.10. Lost future earnings are either construed as
representing a loss to the decedent's estate, see, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-2 (Supp. 1981)
(distribution of recovery to be made in accordance with intestacy laws), or as the decedents
potential contributions to his survivors, see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70 § 2 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1982-1983) (pecuniary loss to "surviving spouse and next of kin" recoverable). But see
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-555 (1981) ("just damages" for injuries of decedent plus reasonable
expenses recoverable). See generally 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 5, § 3:6, at 140-46. After calcu-
lating future earnings, the decedent's estimated personal expenditures must be deducted
from the earnings award. E.g., Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 524 F.2d 384, 389 (2d
Cir. 1975). For a general discussion of other deductions made from lost future earnings in
wrongful death cases, see 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 5, § 3:6, at 144-46; J. STEIN, supra note 1,
§ 237, at 495-96.
In wrongful death actions, of course, it is the size of the decedent's earnings that is used
to measure the plaintiff's damages. 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 5, § 3:5, at 136-38. Since the
calculation of lost future earnings poses similar problems with regard to inflation in both
personal injury and wrongful death actions, this Note will not discuss death claims sepa-
rately in text but will refer to the "plaintiff's" earnings throughout.
7 See, e.g., Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280, 298 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc). Fac-
tors that would have affected a decedents actual gross earnings had he lived include infla-
tion, productivity rates, fringe benefits, income taxes, and the nature of his particular occu-
pation. See, e.g., Coyne, Present Value of Future Earnings: A Sensible Alternative to
Simplistic Methodologies, 49 INS. COUNS. J. 25, 31 (1982) (discussing demographic factors);
Dennis, Sirmon & Drinkwater, Wrongful Death Damages-Fair Compensation for Future
Pecuniary Loss Requires Consideration of Economic Trends and Income Tax Conse-
quences, 47 Miss. L.J. 173, 202-03 (1976) (discussing income taxes, productivity, and infla-
tion); Lipnowski, The Economist's Approach to Assessing Compensation for Accident Vic-
tims, 9 MANITOBA L.J. 319, 324-25 (1979) (discussing future inflation and productivity
gains); Ward, The Economist in Personal Injury and Death Litigation, TaIn, Nov. 1979, at
60, 62 (discussing fringe benefits). For an exhaustive list of considerations that should figure
in computing lost future earnings, see O'Connor & Miller, The Economist-Statistician: A
Source of Expert Guidance in Determining Damages, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 354, 368 (1972).
Formerly, income tax liability that would have been assessed against a plaintiff's earn-
ings had he continued to work was ignored in computing lost future earnings since the
award itself is not taxable. See, e.g., Flanigan v. Burlington N., Inc., 632 F.2d 880, 886-87 &
n.2 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981); Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510
F.2d 234, 236-37 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975), overruled on other grounds,
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The treatment to be accorded future inflation in calculating
Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc); McWeeney v. New York,
N.H. & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1960); Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 672-73
(Alaska 1967); Lumber Terminals, Inc. v. Nowakowski, 36 Md. App. 82, 96-97, 373 A.2d 282,
291-92 (Ct. Spec. App. 1977); see also I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (West 1982). The Supreme Court,
however, in Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980), recently overturned this rule
as a matter of federal law. Id. at 498. In Norfolk, the Court held that future tax liability is
relevant to the computation of lost earnings since it is one of the determinants of the
amount awarded to the wage earner's dependents. Id. at 493-94. The Court reasoned that
since it is relevant to the size of the award, the speculative nature of tax liability should not
preclude its consideration. See id. at 494. In demonstrating how to calculate the impact of
taxes on the lost earnings award, some commentators suggest that the Norfolk rule could
result in higher lump-sum awards for some plaintiffs. See Brady, Brookshire, & Cobb, Cal-
culating the Effects of Income Taxes on Lost Earnings, TRIAL, Sept. 1982, at 65, 68.
' See Dennis, Sirmon & Drinkwater, supra note 7, at 182-84. Inflation has been defined
"as a general increase in the price level and refers to an average change in all prices." HousE
COMM. ON THE BUDGET, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON INFLATION, H.R. REP. No. 12, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1980) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]; see also P. SAMUELSON,
EcoNoMics 270 (10th ed. 1976) (definitions of inflation and deflation).
A distinction must be made between past and future inflation in regard to lost earnings.
See, e.g., Willmore v. Hertz Corp., 437 F.2d 357, 359-60 (6th Cir. 1971). Past inflation refers
to inflation occurring before a judgment is entered. See, e.g., Steckler v. United States, 549
F.2d 1372, 1380 (10th Cir. 1977). Thus, it affects only earnings that accrue up until the date
of judgment. Awards for this portion of lost earning capacity usually are based upon the
plaintiff's actual earnings prior to the accident. See, e.g., In re United States Steel Corp.,
436 F.2d 1256, 1269-70 (6th Cir. 1970) (dictum criticizing an earlier case permitting lost past
earnings to be based on average earnings). In some cases, however, the use of average earn-
ings as the basis for determining lost past earnings has been allowed. See, e.g., Steckler v.
United States, 549 F.2d 1372, 1380 (10th Cir. 1977); Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4,
11-12 (6th Cir. 1956).
Since the award is based upon a static figure, inflation occurring between the date of the
injury and the date of judgment will reduce the plaintiff's effective recovery. See Note, Pre-
assessment Inflation as a Factor in Damages, 48 U. CN. L. REv. 999, 1001-02 (1979). Cur-
rently, attempts to compensate for the effects of such past inflation are limited to including
in the final award interest that the award would have earned up to the date of judgment.
See Ginsburg v. Insurance Co. of N.Am., 427 F.2d 1318, 1321 (6th Cir. 1970); Note, supra, at
1000. Several commentators have argued that awarding such interest does not completely
redress the plaintiff. See Patell, Weil & Wolfson, Accumulating Damages in Litigation: The
Roles of Uncertainty and Interest Rates, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 341, 362 (1982); Note, supra, at
1000. Proposed modifications of this method include accounting for inflation occurring be-
tween the time of the judgment and the time of injury by multiplying the award by the ratio
reflecting the change in the inflation rate. See Note, supra, at 1012-13; cf. Steckler v. United
States, 549 F.2d 1372, 1380 (10th Cir. 1977) (proposing to account for past inflation by com-
pounding the award by the inflation rate between the date of the injury and the date of
judgment).
It should be noted that it may not be accurate to use the same techniques to compen-
sate for both past and future inflation, since it is conceded generally that future inflation is
not likely to increase at the same rate. See, e.g., McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R.,
282 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1960); Henderson, The Consideration of Increased Productivity
and the Discounting of Future Earnings to Present Value, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 307, 321-
22 (1975); see also Coyne, supra note 7, at 25 (assumption of constant future inflation rate
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lost future earnings has become a controversial subject.9 A growing
number of courts and commentators agree that the effects of fu-
ture inflation should be recognized in computing damage awards.10
There is no agreement, however, as to how future inflation should
be incorporated into the structure of existing damage calcula-
tions.11 These issues are interrelated, since the arguments favoring
inclusion of inflation necessarily require discussion of the viability,
in a courtroom setting, of proposed calculation methods. 2 This
Note will analyze these issues in the context of the major policy
concerns that they raise, namely, fairness to the plaintiff, certainty
of the amount of the award, and courtroom efficiency. The Note
then will review the positions taken on these issues by courts and
economists, and conclude with a discussion of two proposed solu-
tions that strike reasonable balances among the underlying policy
concerns.
THE TRADITIONAL RULE FOR DETERMINING LOST FUTURE WAGES
Before engaging in any meaningful discussion of the policy
considerations involved in incorporating inflation into damage cal-
culations, the traditional method for determining lost future earn-
ings must be understood. Under this method, the plaintiff's base
annual earnings for the duration of his working life are estimated
by adding future wage increases that he is reasonably likely to re-
ceive, such as merit raises,"3 to his annual salary as of the date of
most serious source of error in computing awards).
9 See O'Connor & Miller, supra note 7, at 354; infra notes 51-108 and accompanying
text.
10 See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 495 (1980) (dictum); Pfeifer v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 461 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 50
(1982); O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Corp., 677 F.2d 1194, 1200 (7th Cir. 1982); Coyne, supra
note 7, at 25-26; Peck & Hopkins, supra note 2, at 360-61; Note, Future Inflation, Prospec-
tiue Damages, and the Circuit Courts, 63 VA. L. REv. 105, 106-07 (1977); Note, Considera-
tion of Inflation in Calculating Lost Future Earnings, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 803, 804-09
(1977); infra notes 69-108 and accompanying text.
2n E.g., Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981).
12 See, e.g., Note, supra note 10, at 108. A number of courts that have addressed the
inflation issue have noted the need to prevent confusion and prejudice in determining
awards and the practical necessity of ensuring efficient management of trials. See, e.g., Pfei-
fer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 461 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 50
(1982).
" See, e.g., Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280, 286-87 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc)
(dictum). See generally Crosby, supra note 5, at 543; cf. Peck & Hopkins, supra note 2, at
353 (traditional damage calculation rule fails to account for inflation, productivity increases,
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the injury.14 The probable length of the plaintiff's working life, or
his worklife expectancy, 5 is then determined by using actuarial ta-
bles." These figures are multiplied to produce an estimate of the
plaintiff's gross future earnings, which is then discounted to pro-
duce the amount finally awarded. 17
Discounting is the process by which the present value of a sum
to be realized at some definite time in the future is determined.'"
In this process, each year's base salary is multiplied by a discount
factor containing the discount rate,"9 which is an interest rate gen-
and fringe benefits). Most courts are willing to admit evidence of future wage increases. See,
e.g., O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1197-98 (7th Cir. 1982); United States
v. English, 521 F.2d 63, 71 n.5 (9th Cir. 1975); Bach v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 502 F.2d
1117, 1122 (6th Cir. 1974); Magill v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 464 F.2d 294, 300 (3d Cir.
1972). This acceptability appears to depend upon the degree of certainty that the increase
would have been realized. See, e.g., Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 644 F.2d 460, 464 n.7 (5th Cir.
1981) (wage increases granted up to the time of trial are included in calculating the award),
rev'd on other grounds, 688 F.2d 280 (1982) (en banc); State v. Guinn, 555 P.2d 530, 546
(Alaska 1976) (automatic increases based on length of service included in the award).
14 See 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 5, § 3:14, at 169-71; J. STEIN, supra note 1, § 59, at 96-
97. The typical measure of base annual earnings is the plaintiff's salary prior to the injury.
See, e.g., Maxwell v. Wanik, 290 Mich. 106, 108, 287 N.W. 396, 397 (1939); McIver v. Gloria,
169 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Tex. 1943); J. STEIN, supra note 1, § 64, at 103-04. If, for some reason,
the plaintiff's salary at the time of the injury is unrepresentative of his true earning capac-
ity, the use of an average salary figure may be permitted. E.g., Steckler v. United States, 549
F.2d 1372, 1380 (10th Cir. 1977); see supra note 8. In other problem situations, such as
those arising from the death or serious injury of a minor, a homemaker, or one who other-
wise has no employment record, courts have held that just compensation requires that dam-
ages be based on what the plaintiff could have earned in the future. See, e.g., Feldman v.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 524 F.2d 384, 388 (2d Cir. 1975).
15 Henderson, supra note 8, at 308 n.3. Worklife expectancy is the proper measure of
the number of years over which the award will accrue "[b]ecause damages in personal injury
and wrongful death actions involve the earning capacity of wage earners ... ." Id.
16 See 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 5, § 3:27, at 232-38; Peck & Hopkins, supra note 2, at
353.
" Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 490 (1916); Johnson v. Penrod Drill-
ing Co., 510 F.2d 234, 237 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975), overruled
on other grounds, Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc); Sleeman
v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 414 F.2d 305, 308 (6th Cir. 1969); see infra notes 55-59 and
accompanying text.
18 S. KELLISON, THE THEORY OF INTEREST 8-9 (1970).
19 E.g., Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 34 n.4 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981). The discount factor, v, is expressed by the following
equation:
1
v = where i = the discount rate1+i
S. KELLISON, supra note 18, at 8. When the discount factor is multiplied by the requisite
future sum, it yields the present value of that sum. Id.
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erally equated with the current rate on low-risk investments. 0 The
resulting annual figures are then added to produce the total lost
earnings award.2 1 The concept of present value can best be ex-
20 E.g., Ward, supra note 7, at 63. The discount rate applicable to a particular type of
asset depends upon the rate of return that the holder could receive on the asset. See P.
SAMUELSON, supra note 8, at 615 n.4. Most economists recommend that the current interest
rate on low-risk government bonds or similar securities is appropriate for lost future earn-
ings awards, reasoning that a reasonably prudent but financially unsophisticated plaintiff
would invest the award in these types of securities. See Carlson, Economic Analysis v.
Courtroom Controversy: The Present Value of Future Earnings, 62 A.B.A. J. 628, 629-30
(1976); Sherman, Projection of Economic Loss: Inflation v. Present Value, 14 CREIGHTON L.
Rav. 723, 726-27 (1981); Ward, supra note 7, at 63. The federal courts generally have sanc-
tioned this approach. See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1916).
Some economists suggest, however, that it is unrealistic to assume that the plaintiff will be
knowledgeable enough to seek out low-risk government securities, and that a rate based on
the available return on passbook savings accounts should be used. See, e.g., Coyne, supra
note 7, at 28. In contrast to the foregoing, some state courts, those of Pennsylvania for
example, have adopted a standard discount rate. See, e.g., Windle v. Davis, 275 Pa. 23, 29,
118 A. 503, 505 (1922) (6% rate). The recent adoption of the total offset method of account-
ing for inflation by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may not have overturned this rule,
since it only requires a presumption that the wage increase rate equals the discount rate.
See Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 583, 421 A.2d 1027, 1037-38 (1980). The standard
discount rate also has been applied by the courts of Canada and Australia. See Dexter,
Murray, & Pollay, Inflation, Interest Rates and Indemnity: The Economic Realities of
Compensation Awards, 13 U. BRrr. COLUM. L. Rav. 298, 301 (1979) (7% Canadian discount
rate); Sher, Damages for Personal Injuries: Current Developments, Future Trends and
Suggested Reforms, 55 AusTL. L.J. 458, 459-60 (1981) (Australia's highest court appears
consistently to apply a 6% discount rate).
21 E.g., Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 34 n.4 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981). Professor Samuelson gives an excellent explanation of the
discounting process:
To arrive at any asset's present discounted value, let each dollar stand on its own
feet; evaluate the present worth of each part of the stream of future receipts, giv-
ing due allowance for the discounting required by its payment date. Then simply
add together all these separate present discounted values.
P. SAMUELSON, supra note 8, at 616 (emphasis in original). This process can be described in
equation form as follows:
X ZN
Present Value = ( 1 + i) t
t=0
where N = the sum to be discounted over year t
i = the discount rate
t = the number of the year over which N is being discounted (i.e., 1 for
the first year, 2 for the second year)
x= total number of years over which income must be discounted.
Id. at 618. It should be noted that the income for each year must be discounted individually.
Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 34 n.4 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. de-
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plained by use of an example. Suppose that Y has agreed to accept
payment from X of a $10,000 debt 10 years from now. The present
value of X's promise to pay is an amount that, combined with the
return that can be made on it by prudent investment, will equal
$10,000 on the date of payment. Similarly, the present value of lost
future earnings is an amount that, if invested prudently, will yield
a large enough return so that the full amount of the plaintiff's lost
earnings will have been realized by the end of his worklife
expectancy.22
The impetus for discounting lost future earnings is to avoid
giving the plaintiff a windfall,23 since money received today is inva-
riably worth more than the same dollar amount received in the fu-
ture.24 During inflationary periods, however, discounting results in
undercompensating the plaintiff.25 This stems from the nature of
interest rates, as explained by economist Irving Fisher almost 100
years ago.26 According to Professor Fisher's theory, interest rates
have two components: the rate of return that the investor expects
to receive on his investment, or the real rate of interest, and a per-
centage representing the inflation rate that the investor anticipates
over the period of the investment. This additional percentage
nied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981).
22 See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 8, at 615; Franz, Simplifying Future Lost Earnings,
TRIAL, Aug. 1977, at 34, 36.
22 See, e.g., Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 489 (1916); O'Shea v.
Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1982); Sleeman v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry., 414 F.2d 305, 307-08 (6th Cir. 1969); Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 671 (Alaska
1967).
24 E.g., Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 489 (1916). The Kelly Court
deemed "self-evident" the idea that present money is worth more than future payment. Id.
This is true since money presently held can be invested, whereas a promise of future pay-
ment cannot. See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 8, at 615.
215 See Coyne, supra note 7, at 25-26; Peck & Hopkins, supra note 2, at 353-55; infra
notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
26 See I. FISHER, APPRECIATION AND INTEREST 75 (1896).
27 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 20, at 630. Professor Fisher expressed his concept of
the relationship between interest rates and inflation:
The money rate [i.e., the interest rate] and the real rate are normally identi-
cal; that is, they will ... be the same when the purchasing power of the dollar in
terms of the cost of living is constant or stable. When the cost of living is not
stable, the rate of interest takes the appreciation and depreciation into account to
some extent, but only slightly and, in general, indirectly. That is, when prices are
rising, the rate of interest tends to be high but not 'so high as it should be to
compensate for the rise; and when prices are falling, the rate of interest tends to
be low, but not so low as it should be to compensate for the fall.
I. FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST 43 (1930).
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ideally compensates the investor for the diminution of the princi-
pal's purchasing power over the investment period.2 s In the context
of lost future earnings, this means that the inflation component of
the discount rate only purports to compensate the plaintiff for loss
of purchasing power on the original discounted award.2 9 Even if
the discount rate correctly compensates for inflation's effect on the
plaintiff's original award, it cannot account for cost-of-living raises
and other inflation-linked wage increases that would have in-
creased his total lifetime earnings had he continued to work.30 It
follows that an award for lost future earnings calculated in the
traditional manner will undercompensate the plaintiff unless the
inflation rate remains constant throughout the plaintiff's worklife
expectancy.3
1
A number of methods are available to a court seeking to elimi-
nate this shortfall.3 2 Until recently, however, judicial skepticism
concerning the accuracy of economic prediction and the intelligi-
bility of economic evidence to the typical juror militated against
inclusion of inflation in calculating lost future wages. 3 While this
28 See, e.g., O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1982); Sher-
man, supra note 20, at 728; Ward, supra note 7, at 63.
29 E.g., Coyne, supra note 7, at 25-26; Fisher & Hartnett, Admissibility of Economic
Testimony on Future Inflation, 18 S. TEx. L.J. 59, 66 n.39 (1977); Sherman, supra note 20,
at 728-29.
20 See, e.g., O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1982). The
inflation component of the discount rate cannot compensate for cost-of-living raises the
plaintiff otherwise would have received because such raises increase the plaintiff's annual
salary-the basis of the original award. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
31 E.g., Carlson, supra note 20, at 629; Henderson, supra note 8, at 310.
32 See, e.g., Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 38 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981). Methods proposed by courts seeking to deal with
the effect of inflation on lost future earnings include: estimating the inflation rate based
upon economic evidence and compounding future earnings by this rate prior to discounting,
see, e.g., United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63, 76 (9th Cir. 1975), estimating the real rate of
interest and discounting with that rate, see, e.g., Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense,
S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 39 & n.10 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981), and eliminat-
ing discounting from the calculation process, see, e.g., Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 461 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982). See generally Note,
supra note 10, at 113-25; Note, Future Inflation as a Factor in the Determination of Dam-
ages, 12 U. TOL. L. Rv. 369, 382-89 (1981).
3 See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 494 (1980) (dictum); Pfeifer v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 461 (3d Cir.) (discussing future inflation), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982); Note, supra note 10, at 105. Remarks evincing judicial mis-
trust of economic prediction of inflation can be found in several cases. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839
(1975), overruled, Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc); cf.
McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 36-38 (2d Cir. 1960) (in context of
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skepticism has diminished in recent years,3 4 these underlying con-
cerns still pose obstacles to the adoption of a new damages calcula-
tion rule. Since the arguments against including inflation illumi-
nate the interrelationship of these policy concerns, it is appropriate
to consider them in some detail.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST INCLUSION OF INFLATION IN LOST FUTURE
EARNINGS
The rule against considering inflation in calculating damages
originally was justified on the ground that there was no certainty
that inflation would continue in the future, and to assume its con-
tinuance amounted to speculation.35 This rationale was reasonable
prior to World War II, when price levels in the American economy
tended to be stable and deflation was a more common phenomenon
than inflation.36 Postwar economic statistics, however, demonstrate
future income tax liability).
" See, e.g., Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 35 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981). Recently, federal courts appear to be taking the
view that while prediction of future inflation is in some degree speculative, such speculation
is more tolerable than ignoring inflation altogether. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Riverway Towing
Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63, 75 (9th
Cir. 1975): Several state courts also have taken this view. See, e.g., Seaboard Coast Line
R.R. v. Garrison, 336 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Cords v. Anderson, 80 Wis.
2d 525, 551-52, 259 N.W.2d 672, 684 (1977).
" See Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 566-67, 421 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1980). For
examples of cases that have both stated and applied the traditional rule of not considering
inflation, see Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975), overruled, Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir.
1982); Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1346 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 466 F.2d
1226 (3d Cir. 1972). But see Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 461 (3d Cir.),
cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982); United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63, 75 (9th Cir. 1975).
Many cases, however, merely characterize inflation as "speculative." See, e.g., Williams v.
United States, 435 F.2d 804, 807 (1st Cir. 1970); Sleeman v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 414
F.2d 305, 308 (6th Cir. 1969). But see Magill v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 464 F.2d 294, 300
(3d Cir. 1972) ("valid data" necessary to keep the jury from speculating about inflation). It
appears that this characterization is based upon uncertainty as to the continuance of infla-
tion. See, e.g., Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280, 287 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc); Pfeifer
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 678 F.2d 453, 461 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 50
(1982).
11 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 24; Henderson, supra note 8, at 309; see P.
SAMUELSON, supra note 8, at 270. Ample statistical data support the conclusion that infla-
tion was not an American economic problem before World War II. Before 1913, for example,
the average annual change in the American price level was 0.1%. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENT, 1981, at 71 (Table 3-2) (1981) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC REPORT]. Be-
tween 1919 and the start of World War II, the average annual change was 2.5%. Id. From
1946 to 1979, the average annual change was 2.8%. Id. These statistics are based on the
Consumer Price Index (CPI), which measures changes in the price level based on monthly
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a consistent increase in wages and prices.37 It is generally agreed
today that inflation will continue to afflict the American
economy.38
More difficult to answer is the charge that present economic
measurements of the prices of a "fixed marketbasket" of goods. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 8, at 27. The CPI is "the most widely recognized measure of inflation in the United
States." Id.
37 E.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 24. The natural effect of rising prices is to
cause the purchasing power of money to decline. P. SAMUELSON, supra note 8, at 270-72. As
shown by the following chart, measurement of the dollar's purchasing power in terms of its
value in 1967 reveals a consistent decline since 1940:
Annual Average Value as Measured By-
Year Producer Prices Consumer Prices
1940 $2.469 $2.381
1945 1.832 1.855
1950 1.266 1.387
1955 1.170 1.247
1960 1.067 1.127
1965 1.045 1.058
1967 1.000 1.000
1970 .907 .860
1975 .612 .621
1976 .586 .587
1977 .550 .551
1978 .510 .512
1979 .459 .461
1980 .405 .406
1981 (to May) .372 .372
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrrED STATES, 1981, No. 765, at 458 (Table) (1981). For a
summary of the price history of the United States over the postwar period that combines
statistics with explanations of why inflation has become such a persistent problem, see TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 24-26.
" E.g., Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 573, 421 A.2d 1027, 1033 (1980); Malabre,
Analysts See Inflation Easing, Then Rising, But Not to Old Peaks, Wall St. J., Mar. 10,
1982, at 1, col. 6. It should not be assumed that the rate of inflation necessarily will increase
in the future. See, e.g., ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 36, at 213. Indeed, some economists
have postulated that the rate of increase in inflation may decrease over the course of the
1980's. See, e.g., id.; Miller, Slowdowns in Economic Activity and the Rate of Inflation,
ECON. REV. FED. RES. BANK KAN. CITY, Sept.-Oct. 1981, at 18, 27; cf. Malabre, supra, at 1,
col. 6 (inflation expected to continue at lower rates than in recent past, but increase does
not necessarily indicate a long-term trend). Economists expressing this opinion, however,
also believe that decreases in inflation depend upon the successful implementation of fiscal
policy. See, e.g., Impact of Inflation on the Economy: Hearings Before the Task Force on
Inflation of the House Comm. on the Budget, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 249 (1979) (attachment
by Prof. Linden); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 30; ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note
36, at 214-15; Miller, supra, at 27. The consensus appears to be that preventing inflation will
continue to be a major economic policy concern throughout the 1980's. See PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION FOR A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR THE EIGHTIES, THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: EMPLOY-
MENT, PRODUCTIVITY AND INFLATION IN THE EIGHTIES 47-48 (1980).
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techniques for predicting future inflation amount to little more
than sophisticated speculation." This contention, voiced by several
economists,40 has elicited two types of response. First, it has been
noted that other elements of damages whose determination neces-
sarily requires speculation, such as pain and suffering, are rou-
tinely calculated.41 Second, the practical result of refusing to ac-
count for inflation has been deemed identical to that of assuming
an inflation rate of zero-an assumption that contradicts available
economic data.42 Arguably, such an assumption is even more spec-
11 See, e.g., Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 524 F.2d 384, 392 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Friendly, J., concurring dubitante) (citing Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342 (1921)) (re-
ferring to "'the dangers of a delusive exactness'" in inflation calculations); Bach v. Penn
Cent. Transp. Co., 502 F.2d 1117, 1122 (6th Cir. 1974); Blue v. Western Ry., 469 F.2d 487,
494-96 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 956 (1973). There has been some concern that
juries may attempt to estimate inflation rates based upon their own knowledge. See, e.g.,
Zaninovich v. American Airlines, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 155, 160, 271 N.Y.S.2d 866, 872 (1st
Dep't 1966) ("amateurish speculation" concerning inflation not to be considered in damage
calculations).
40 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 20, at 628; Formuzis & O'Donnell, Inflation and the
Valuation of Future Economic Losses, 38 MONT. L. REv. 297, 299 (1977). But see Fisher &
Hartnett, supra note 29, at 81 (more realistic awards result from the admission of evidence
regarding inflationary trends); Ward, supra note 7, at 60 (use of probabilities in inflation
rate predictions does not necessarily make those predictions speculative).
41 See C. MCCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 88, at 318; J. STEIN, supra note 1, § 9, at 15. In
addition to pain and suffering, other elements of damages, such as lost future profits, are
sanctioned despite speculation as to their determination. See Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot,
Inc., 434 F.2d 556, 564-67 (2d Cir. 1970). Permitting such recovery is justified by an unwill-
ingness to allow tortfeasors to benefit from the uncertainties of estimating a plaintiff's in-
jury. See J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 567 (1981); Bigelow v.
RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946). This is not to say, however, that
there are no guidelines for the jury in determining suitable awards for such damages. The
values chosen must have some basis in the evidence presented. See, e.g., 327 U.S. at 264;
Autowest, Inc., v. Peugeot, Inc., 434 F.2d 556, 566 (2d Cir. 1970).
42 See Henderson, supra note 8, at 309. The assumption of a zero inflation rate does not
necessarily mean that the price level is assumed to be unchanging. Usually, it merely implies
the assumption of a constant level of price change over time. See STATISTCAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1981 § 15, at 457 (1981) (defining CPI as a measure of average change
in prices). Available data indicates that while the price level, as measured by the CPI, has
risen steadily over time, its growth was more rapid in some years than others. Compare
ECONOMIc REPORT, supra note 36, at 294 (showing consistent rise in CPI for the years 1939-
1981) with TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 24-26 (discussing irregularities in the size
of the increase of the CPI for the years 1940-1979). Because of this history of erratic CPI
fluctuations, some economists argue that projection of the current rate of inflation over time
still results in undercompensation to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Coyne, supra note 7, at 25-26.
This shortcoming, however, is common to all of the proposed methods of compensating for
inflation, with the possible exception of periodic payment of judgment plans. See infra note
123. As the Second Circuit has indicated, however, it is natural to base predictions of future
conditions on past trends. Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 37 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981). Consequently, courts do not expect absolute
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ulative than attempting to predict the inflation rate.4 The mere
fact that prediction of future inflation involves some speculation,
therefore, does not justify refusal to account for inflation in dam-
age awards.
The strongest arguments against recognizing the impact of in-
flation on damages are pragmatic, and arise from the peculiar diffi-
culties of trying damages issues before a jury. It is contended, for
example, that the admission of economic evidence will confuse a
jury44 or result in unfair verdicts due to passion or prejudice.45
Such arguments are bolstered by the fact that there is greater
room for dispute concerning the validity of an economic hypothe-
sis, as opposed to other scientific theories, because economic hy-
potheses are not susceptible to empirical verification.46 Indeed,
there is little consensus among economists concerning the proper
treatment of inflation in damage calculations.
accuracy in damage awards. E.g., O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1200 (7th
Cir. 1982); Doca, 634 F.2d at 38. It is submitted that economists, when making proposals
concerning the future inflation problem, should be aware of this pragmatism on the part of
judges.
'3 See Coyne, supra note 7, at 29; Formuzis & O'Donnell, supra note 40, at 299.
See, e.g., Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 461 (3d Cir.), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982); Riha v. Jasper Blackburn Corp., 516 F.2d 840, 843 (8th Cir.
1975); Magill v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 464 F.2d 294, 300-01 (3d Cir. 1972); McWeeney v.
New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 38-40 (2d Cir. 1960); Carlson, supra note 20, at 629;
Franz, supra note 22, at 37.
45 See, e.g., Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 743 (3d Cir. 1976); Raines v. New York
Cent. R.R., 129 Ill. App. 2d 294, 305-06, 263 N.E.2d 895, 900-01 (Ct. App. 1970), rev'd on
other grounds, 51 III. 2d 428, 283 N.E.2d 230, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972). While there
is concern over presenting economic evidence to a lay jury, the possibility of uninformed
speculation by the jury regarding future inflation has been used as an argument in favor of
admitting such evidence. See, e.g., Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, 67 N.J. 466, 481-84, 341 A.2d
613, 621-23 (1975).
4' See J. CRAMER, EMPmICAL ECONOMERmICS 2 (1971). One reason for the problems of
verification posed by economic theory is that a significant portion of important economic
data is not quantifiable. See id. at 2-3; 0. MORGENSTERN, ON THE ACCURACY OF ECONOMIC
OBSERVATIONS 3-5 (1963). A more basic flaw is that economic models often are too general to
be tested by experimental means. J. CRAMER, supra, at 2. Consequently, econometric studies
tend to include specific hypotheses which fit the situation and data around which the study
is designed, but which have little connection with the economic theories that they purport
to prove. See id.; P. SAMUELSON, supra note 8, at 10-13.
47 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 20, at 628. Most economists who have debated the role
of inflation in damage calculations agree that inflation must be taken into account to pro-
duce an accurate estimate of lost future earnings. See id. at 629-30; Coyne, supra note 7, at
25-26; Fisher & Hartnett, supra note 29, at 59-60; Formuzis & O'Donnell, supra note 40, at
297-98; Franz, supra note 22, at 36; Henderson, supra note 8, at 310-11; Lebrenz, The Infla-
tionary Impact Upon the Economic Loss From Impaired Earning Capacity, 69 ILL. B.J.
372, 372 (1981); Sherman, supra note 20, at 733; Ward, supra note 7, at 62.
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Despite the problems involved in adopting an inflation-com-
pensating rule, a number of courts and economists have concluded
that the traditional view of the role of inflation in damage calcula-
tions is no longer viable.48 Departure from this view, however, re-
quires careful evaluation of the relative importance of and con-
cerns for equity, certainty, and efficiency. 49 The specific question
raised is whether the objectives of damages law dictate awards that
estimate lost future earnings as precisely as possible, or awards
that are insulated as completely as possible from confusion and
prejudice. Until recently, federal courts adhered to the traditional
rule primarily out of a distrust of economic predictions, as a brief
review of judicial treatment of the issue demonstrates.5 0 Four
stages can be discerned in the courts' movement away from the
traditional rule: recognition of the impact of inflation upon awards;
acceptance of jury consideration of inflation's impact; admission of
economic evidence concerning future inflation rates; and evalua-
tion of methods for including inflation in damage calculations.
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF INFLATION IN DAMAGE CALCULATIONS
Most early cases conceded that inflation existed.5 1 For exam-
ple, awards rendered during a period of high inflation were not
considered excessive if they were larger than awards for similar in-
juries made during less inflationary periods, even if the difference
was substantial.5 2 The deflation prevalent during the pre-World
" See, e.g., Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 461 (3d Cir.), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982); O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1200 (7th Cir.
1982); United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63, 75 (9th Cir. 1975); Lumber Terminals, Inc. v.
Nowakowski, 36 Md. App. 82, 94-95, 373 A.2d 282, 290 (Ct. App. 1977); Kaczkowski v.
Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 572-73, 421 A.2d 1027, 1033 (1980); Fisher & Hartnett, supra note 29,
at 59; Henderson, supra note 8, at 307; Peck & Hopkins, supra note 2, at 352.
'9 See Comment, Inflation and Future Loss of Earnings, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 281, 287
(1975); 62 CORNELL L. REV., supra note 10, at 816.
1* See infra notes 55-108 and accompanying text. References in the discussion of fed-
eral gravitation away from the traditional rule will incorporate both state and federal cases,
partly because the federal courts have been slower than the state courts to reject the tradi-
tional rule. See Henderson, supra note 8, at 307, 319 n.20.
51 See Note, Fluctuating Dollars and Tort Damage Verdicts, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 264,
264 n.1, 266 (1948). But cf. Halloran v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 Vt. 273, 284-85, 115
A. 143, 148 (1921) (Watson, C.J., dissenting) (permitting jury to consider purchasing power
changes contravenes Congress' power to establish a uniform currency). Most early cases took
notice of inflation in the context of reviewing an award for excessiveness. See, e.g., Philadel-
phia & R. Ry. v. McKibbin, 259 F. 476, 479-80 (3d Cir. 1919).
2 See, e.g., Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. McKibbin, 259 F. 476, 479-80 (3d Cir. 1919); Ar-
mentrout v. Virginian Ry., 72 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (S.D. W. Va. 1947) (applying West Virginia
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War II era5" affected damage awards, since the increasing purchas-
ing power of money resulted in overcompensating a plaintiff if his
award was not discounted to present value. 4 In 1916, the United
States Supreme Court recognized this economic reality in Chesa-
peake & Ohio Railway v. Kelly.5 5 In Kelly, the Court reversed a
wrongful death award because of the trial judge's refusal to require
that the jury discount the decedent's lost future earnings to pre-
sent value.56 The Court declared that "as a rule . . . the ascer-
tained future benefits ought to be discounted in the making up of
the award. '5 7 Although Kelly only mandated discounting of awards
determined under federal law,5s the rule subsequently was adopted
by state courts.59
law); Burke v. City & County of San Francisco, 111 Cal. App. 2d 314, 320-21, 244 P.2d 708,
713 (Ct. App. 1952); Gale v. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 13 Hun 1, 4 (3d Dep't
1878), aff'd, 76 N.Y. 594 (1879); Halloran v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 Vt. 273, 275-
76, 115 A. 143, 144 (1921); Note, supra note 51, at 266.
53 See Henderson, supra note 8, at 309; supra note 36 and accompanying text.
See Henderson, supra note 8, at 309.
55 241 U.S. 485, 491 (1916).
1, Id. at 493.
57 Id. at 490. The Kelly Court's discussion of the factors involved in computing lost
future earnings raised several issues that have since proven troublesome to the judiciary.
For example, the Court suggested that the discount rate reflects rates available on low-risk
investments. Id. The highest legal rate of interest need not be used, since that rate may only
be obtainable by skilled investors. Id. Additionally, the Court alluded to the difficulties in-
volved in requiring jurors to deal with economic considerations, but refused to rule on
whether expert economic witnesses or present value tables should be admitted into evi-
dence. Id. at 491. These matters were left to the "law of the forum." Id. Moreover, there is
dictum in Kelly suggesting that the Court might have been willing, had the issue arisen, to
require the inclusion of future inflation in damage calculations. Id. Indeed, the Court em-
phasized that "[i]n computing the damages recoverable for the deprivation of future bene-
fits, the principle of limiting the recovery to compensation requires that adequate allow-
ance be made, according to circumstances, for the earning power of money .... " Id.
(emphasis added).
"See id. at 491. The action in Kelly was founded upon the Federal Employers Liabil-
ity Act. Id. at 486.
" See, e.g., 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 5, § 8:1, at 700; J. STEIN, supra note 1, § 169, at
328. Discounting not only generally has been adopted by the states, but has been extended
to cover a number of different types of future damages. See, e.g., Noble v. Tweedy, 90 Cal.
App. 2d 738, 747, 203 P.2d 778, 783 (Ct. App. 1940) (future damages in contract action);
Turcol v. Jenkins, 49 Del. 596, 598-99, 122 A.2d 224, 225 (1956) (wrongful death action);
Freeman v. Lanning Corp., 61 Mich. App. 527, 529, 233 N.W.2d 68, 70 (Ct. App. 1975)
(future losses on breach of lease); Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. Edwards, 361 P.2d 459,
467 (Okla. 1961) (personal injury action). Other jurisdictions have adopted the discounting
rule by statute. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.51(1)(2)-(b) (West Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. LAws §
10-7-1.1 (Supp. 1982). The Rhode Island statute also requires some form of compensation
for inflation. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-1.1 (Supp. 1982). A few jurisdictions recently have
rejected the discounting rule as a means of accounting for inflation. See Beaulieu v. Elliott,
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After Kelly, courts were disinclined to expand the rules per-
taining to the consideration of inflation in calculating damages.6 0
This was due, at least in part, to the courts' belief that the infla-
tion-rate component of the discount rate sufficiently recompensed
the plaintiff for the impact of inflation on the award. 1 Juries were
permitted to consider inflation, but only based upon their common
knowledge.6 2 It generally was held that instructing the jury on in-
flation did not constitute reversible error, 3 but it was also held
that refusal to give such instruction was not ground for reversal.6
Consequently, consideration of inflation was essentially a matter
for the jury's discretion.6
434 P.2d 665, 671 (Alaska 1967); Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 579 & n.21, 421 A.2d
1027, 1036 & n.21 (1980).
60 See, e.g., J. STEIN, supra note 1, § 170, at 330. Courts have been reluctant to formu-
late a requirement that inflation be considered in determining tort damages. See Lumber
Terminals, Inc. v. Nowakowski, 36 Md. App. 82, 94-95, 373 A.2d 282, 290 (Ct. App. 1977);
see also Schnebly v. Baker, 217 N.W.2d 708, 727 (fewer courts have addressed the question
of future inflation than have dealt with past inflation), rev'd on other grounds, 221 N.W.2d
739 (Iowa 1974).
61 See, e.g., Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 236 & n.1 (5th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975), overruled en banc in Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688
F.2d 280 (1982); Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1346 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd,
466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 594 S.W.2d 496, 506
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979), aff'd in part, 453 U.S. 473 (1981). The belief that increasing market
rates of interest are sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for the impact of inflation on his
award is based upon a misconception of what the inflation component of the interest rate is
meant to recompense. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
62 E.g., Riha v. Jasper Blackburn Corp., 516 F.2d 840, 843 (8th Cir. 1975) (applying
Nebraska law); Bach v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 502 F.2d 1117, 1122 (6th Cir. 1974); Hal-
loran v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 Vt. 273, 276, 115 A. 143, 144 (1921). But see Byrd
v. Reederei, 638 F.2d 1300, 1307, rev'd en banc, 688 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1982); Williams v.
United States, 435 F.2d 804, 807 (1st Cir. 1970) (applying Rhode Island law).
6$ E.g., Taenzler v. Burlington N., Inc., 608 F.2d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 1979); Loetzerich v.
Texas Pac.-Mo. Pac. Terminal R.R., 325 So. 2d 626, 629 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Atwood v.
Lever, 274 So. 2d 146, 149 (Miss. 1973); Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466, 475 &
n.7, 341 A.2d 613, 618 & n.7 (1975).
64 E.g., Bearden v. LeMaster, 284 Ala. 588, 590-91, 226 So. 2d 647, 649-50 (1969); Wil-
lard v. Hutson, 234 Or. 148, 168, 378 P.2d 966, 976 (1963). But see Beanland v. Chicago
Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 480 F.2d 109, 115 (8th Cir. 1973).
65 See Fisher & Hartnett, supra note 29, at 63-64. It appears to have been the state
courts' view that the jury was free to consider or not consider the impact of inflation with-
out evidence. See, e.g., Louisville & N.R. v. Scott's Adm'r, 188 Ky. 99, 103, 220 S.W. 1066,
1068 (1920); Halloran v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 Vt. 273, 276, 115 A. 143, 144
(1921). Most federal courts apparently do not allow the jury to consider the impact of infla-
tion unless it has evidence upon which to base its conclusions. See, e.g., Blue v. Western
Ry., 469 F.2d 487, 496 (5th Cir. 1972); Magill v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 464 F.2d 294, 300
(3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 956 (1973). But see Baker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,
502 F.2d 638, 644 (6th Cir. 1974).
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Attempts by counsel to compel evaluation of inflation by sub-
mitting evidence as to trends of general wage increases originally
were rejected, since such evidence was considered too speculative
to support a damage award.6 This rule was relaxed by later deci-
sions admitting evidence showing a trend of wage increases in the
plaintiff's occupation. 7 Additionally, evidence showing inflationary
trends in the economy at large, or attempting to link increases in
national productivity and inflation rates to wages in the plaintiff's
occupation were excluded as speculative.6 " While this position still
is maintained by some state courts,6 9 recent circuit court decisions
suggest that admissibility of evidence of inflationary trends is be-
coming the majority rule in the federal system.70
A number of federal cases have devoted extensive discussion
to the question of how inflation should be accounted for in damage
calculations.7 1 These decisions appear to be laying the groundwork
66 See, e.g., Magill v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 464 F.2d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 1972) (dic-
tum); McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 36, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1960)
(dictum).
67 See, e.g., Taenzler v. Burlington N., Inc., 608 F.2d 796, 799, 801 (8th Cir. 1979); Ma-
gill v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 464 F.2d 294, 300-01 (3d Cir. 1972) (dictum); In re United
States Steel Corp., 436 F.2d 1256, 1274-75 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971).
68 E.g., Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422, 435 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 830 (1977); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 743 (3d Cir. 1976); Bach v. Penn Cent.
Transp. Co., 502 F.2d 1117, 1122 (6th Cir. 1974); In re United States Steel Corp., 436 F.2d
1256, 1275 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971); Williams v. United States, 435
F.2d 804, 807 (1st Cir. 1970).
69 See, e.g., Raines v. New York Cent. R.R., 129 II. App. 2d 294, 303-04, 263 N.E.2d
895, 900 (App. Ct. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 51 Ill. 2d 428, 283 N.E.2d 230, cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972).
70 See, e.g., Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 39 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981); Steckler v. United States, 549 F.2d 1372, 1376-77
(10th Cir. 1977); United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63, 74 (9th Cir. 1975).
Notably, the Federal Rules of Evidence appear to support the admissibility of inflation
testimony. Fisher & Hartnett, supra note 29, at 78-79. Inflation testimony usually is given
by economists, who are considered experts in a field of "specialized knowledge." See FED. R.
EVID. 702. More importantly, as Professor Rothstein has observed, "the area testified to
need not be 'beyond lay comprehension,'... but need only be an area where expert help
would be of 'assist[ance]'." P. ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF Evi-
DaNCE 80 (1973). Arguably, economic prediction of inflation is such an area. See Fisher, Use
of an Economist to Prove Future Economic Losses, 18 S. TEX. L.J. 403, 411-13 (1977).
Moreover, under the federal rules, opinion testimony is admissible even though based on
evidence which is inadmissible in itself. FED. R. EvID. 703; see P. ROTHSTEIN, supra, at 81-
82.
", E.g., Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280, 295-311 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc); Doca
v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 34-40 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 971 (1981); Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 524 F.2d 384, 386-90 (2d Cir. 1975);
United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63, 72-76 (9th Cir. 1975).
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for a new damage calculation rule under federal law. 2 In United
States v. English,7 3 the Ninth Circuit reversed a damage award be-
cause, in an attempt to compensate for future inflation, the trial
judge had refused to discount the plaintiff's lost future earnings to
present value.7 4 The English court found this method clearly erro-
neous, 7 but recognized that "to ignore inflation when the rates are
high is to ignore economic reality." 6 The court concluded that in-
flation rate changes that could be postulated with "some reliabil-
ity" could be taken into account." The English court proposed a
formula under which gross future earnings are compounded by the
estimated future inflation rate, before deducting taxes and dece-
dent's personal expenditures."" This figure is then discounted to
present value.79
Following the Ninth Circuit's decision in English, the Second
Circuit, in Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,s0 upheld a district
court's award based upon Connecticut law, insofar as it accounted
for inflation by decreasing the discount rate by the estimated rate
of future inflation."" After reviewing a number of state and federal
72 See Note, Future Inflation, supra note 10, at 106; Note, Considering Inflation in
Calculating Lost Future Earnings, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 499, 499 (1979).
73 521 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1975).
74 Id. at 71 & n.7. In English, a wrongful death claim was brought under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). 521 F.2d at 65. The law to be applied in such an
action is "the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
(1976). Since the English plaintiff's injury occurred in California, the Ninth Circuit applied
California law in deciding damage issues. 521 F.2d at 65.
75 521 F.2d at 72.
"6 Id. at 75; see, e.g., Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 435, 460-61 (3d
Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982); O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194,
1200 (7th Cir. 1982).
7 521 F.2d at 75-76.
78 Id. at 76.
79 Id. The English method subsequently was adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Steckler
v. United States, 549 F.2d 1372, 1378 (10th Cir. 1977). The Steckler court reversed an award
because of the trial court's failure to account for inflation in calculating lost future earnings.
Id. at 1380. The court briefly summarized the total offset method of Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434
P.2d 665, 671 (Alaska 1967), see infra note 100, and the admission of evidence of inflation-
ary trends in Riha v. Jasper Blackburn Corp., 516 F.2d 840, 845 (8th Cir. 1975), as well as
the Feldman and English approaches. 549 F.2d at 1377-78. While the court did not explain
its doubts regarding the Beaulieu, Riha, and Feldman approaches, it did state its belief that
the English approach was the "best rationale" since it dealt more adequately with "inflation
trends." See id.
80 524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1975).
61 Id. at 388. Feldman involved a wrongful death action governed by Connecticut law.
Id. at 386. Connecticut law requires that recovery in wrongful death cases be measured in
terms of the value to the decedent of the loss of her life. Id. Under this standard of valua-
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cases dealing with inflation questions, the Feldman court observed
that while estimating inflation requires some recourse to specula-
tion, such estimations have been countenanced by state courts in
the past.8 2
The most recent circuit court cases to evaluate methods of ac-
counting for inflation have been influenced by the decisions in
Feldman and English, although each has reached a slightly differ-
ent conclusion concerning the wisdom of the English and Feldman
approaches.8 3 In Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 4
the Second Circuit upheld the trial court's decision to take infla-
tion into account.8 " The Doca court examined its prior cases, in-
cluding Feldman, in which it had looked favorably upon including
inflation in the determination of lost future earnings.8 6 Although
refusing to adopt a calculation method by judicial fiat, the court
indicated cautious approval of a method similar to the Feldman
approach.87 In O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co.,88 the Seventh Cir-
tion, the court found no error in the district judge's attempt to compensate for the effect of
inflation on the award. Id. at 387-88. The amount of the award, however, was held to be
erroneous due to the district judge's underestimation of the decedent's living expenses. Id.
at 389-90.
11 Id. at 387. In his oft-cited concurrence, Judge Friendly observed that the state and
federal decisions on the question of estimating inflation are "in a stage of uncertainty and
flux," and that in many instances state case law yields no clue as to how the highest state
courts would rule on an inflation question. Id. at 390 & n.1 (Friendly, J., concurring dubi-
tante). While critical of the assumptions accepted by the majority in calculating the award,
Judge Friendly was reluctant to advocate a remand since the parameters of state law were
so uncertain. Id. at 393 (Friendly, J., concurring dubitante).
83See, e.g., Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280, 309-10 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc);
Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 460-61 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S.
Ct. 50 (1982); O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1200 (7th Cir. 1982); Doca v.
Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 38-40 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 971 (1981).
634 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981).
11 634 F.2d at 40. The Doca court recognized that no evidence had been submitted
justifying the use of the low one percent discount rate adopted by the district court. Id. Of
greater significance was the court's finding that by both removing the inflation-compensat-
ing component from the discount rate and including cost-of-living increases, the district
court had double-counted inflation. Id.
" Id. at 35. The court observed that "[i]n this Circuit, the issue [of inflation] has been
considered but not resolved." Id. The court examined cases from other circuits which made
allowance for inflation. Id. at 35-36. Since Doca involved a maritime personal injury claim, it
was decided under federal law. See id. at 32.
87 Id. at 38-40. The Doca court observed that the data gathered in Feldman showed "a
fairly constant relationship between interest and inflation rates," and that this relationship
might be used to account directly for the effects of inflation. Id. at 37-39. The court also
indicated that, based on the data presented in Feldman, a standard real rate of two percent
could be used in all lost earnings calculations. Id. at 39-40 & n.10.
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cuit upheld an award made by a district judge who had considered
a significant amount of inflation evidence, including testimony of
the plaintiff's expert economist.8 9 Like the Doca court, the O'Shea
panel reviewed a number of different approaches to the problem.e0
The court examined the methods espoused by English and Feld-
man,9 1 noting their similarities, 92 and indicated that both were ac-
ceptable.9 3 The O'Shea court declined, however, to mandate the
use of a particular method in figuring inflation into damages.9 4
The most recent opinion examining calculation methods in de-
tail was delivered by the Fifth Circuit in Culver v. Slater Boat
Co. 5 The Culver court abandoned the traditional rule in favor of
weighing economic evidence on a case-by-case basis to determine
the extent to which inflation should be included in lost future
earnings.96 After evaluating and rejecting its prior contrary deci-
88 677 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1982). O'Shea involved a personal injury action brought
under federal admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 1196.
89 Id. at 1200-01. The trial judge allowed the plaintiff's economist to testify as to his
methodology and calculations as well as to his earnings estimates. Id. at 1196-97. The econo-
mist presented a series of earnings estimates r~nging from $50,000 to $114,000, depending
upon the discount rate selected. Id. at 1197. The trial judge awarded $86,033 for lost future
earnings without explaining how he arrived at that figure, despite the federal rule requiring
a judge trying a case without a jury to give a written explanation for the award that he
makes. Id. at 1201; see FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Since the trial court might have arrived at its
award by assuming "reasonable" inflation and discount rates of three percent and two per-
cent respectively, the award was held not to be unreasonably high. See 677 F.2d at 1201.
90 677 F.2d at 1199-1200.
91 Id. The O'Shea court reviewed the Feldman and English approaches without men-
tioning either case by name. See id.
92 Id. at 1200. The Feldman and English methods produce close, though not identical
results. See Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 524 F.2d at 391 (Friendly, J., concurring
dubitante). Indeed, the Feldman concurrence noted a less than $2,000 differential when
both methods are applied to a $250,000 award. Id. (Friendly, J., concurring dubitante).
93 677 F.2d at 1200.
91 Id. The O'Shea court explained that discounting without including future inflation in
base earnings undercompensates the plaintiff. Id. The court also mentioned some elements
of the economist's method that the defendant could have challenged as erroneous. Id. at
1200-01. For example, inflation is not the only factor that causes base earnings to rise, con-
trary to the economist's assumption. Id. at 1200. Additionally, the court indicated that merit
raises have an impact, as do real wages, in other sectors of the economy. Id. The economist
was overly optimistic, the court believed, in assuming that the plaintiff, a 57-year old wo-
man not in robust health, would continue to work full time until her 70th birthday. Id. The
court also raised the point that a woman in the plaintiff's tax bracket would be unlikely to
invest in tax-free municipal bonds, as her economist assumed. Id. at 1201. Finally, the court
questioned the economist's deduction of all taxes that the plaintiff would have been as-
sessed on the lost earnings; the plaintiff would have to pay taxes only on the interest she
would receive on the award. Id.
95 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
96 Id. at 310-11. The Culver decision overruled Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d
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sions, the court analyzed available inflation-compensating meth-
ods. 97 Like the Second98 and Seventh Circuits,99 the Fifth Circuit
concluded that inflation evidence should be admissible, but that it
would be inappropriate to adopt a particular calculation method as
a matter of law.100
Unlike its sister circuits, the Third Circuit in Pfeifer v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp.,10 1 adopted a rule to account for the im-
pact of inflation on lost future earnings. 102 In Pfeifer, the court up-
234 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975), which held that inflation is too
speculative to be included in future damage calculations. 688 F.2d at 283; see 510 F.2d at
241. The Penrod court took judicial notice of the existence of inflation, but concluded that
present inflation did not render future inflation sufficiently certain to justify including it in
a damages calculation rule. 510 F.2d at 236. The court justified its holding by stating that
inflationary increases could be symptoms of an approaching recession or depression, instead
of demonstrating a continuing inflationary trend. Id. The court also stated that increases in
the discount rate caused by inflation would suffice to mitigate inflation's impact on the
plaintiff's award. Id.
I See 688 F.2d at 295-306. The Culver court reversed the district court, which had
refused to permit the inflation issue to be raised at trial by excluding relevant evidence, jury
instructions, and interrogatories. Id. at 283.
11 See Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 39 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981).
"See O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1200 (7th Cir. 1982).
100 See 688 F.2d at 308, 310-11. The court devoted most of its attention to the "total
offset" method and the Feldman rule. See id. at 302. Under the total offset method, the
inflation rate is presumed to equal the discount rate, and is removed from the award by
eliminating the discounting process. Id. at 299 & nn.26-27. The court rejected this approach,
however, since it does not take into account the earnings histories of individual plaintiffs
and would tend to overcompensate the plaintiff if the rate of wage increase in his industry
was less than the CPI. See id. at 299, 308.
The Feldman rule was criticized on two grounds. See id. at 302. First, the court noted
that this rule necessarily assumes that the plaintiff's future earnings would have kept pace
with inflation, which may not be true. Id. Second, the Feldman method's accuracy is less-
ened if future economic conditions differ significantly from the present conditions. Id. De-
spite these problems, the court considered the Feldman method acceptable. Id. at 302.
A number of the Fifth Circuit judges disagreed with the Culver majority. Judge Hill
thought that the Feldman approach should be adopted for use in future earnings calcula-
tions. Id. at 312 (Hill, J., concurring). Judge Hill viewed the evidence-weighing approach as
granting the jury too much latitude to speculate about the appropriate rate of future infla-
tion without offering sufficient guidance. Id. In a dissent, Judge Clark contended that the
Penrod rule was preferable to one requiring juries to wrestle with conflicting economic evi-
dence. See id. at 314 (Clark, J., dissenting). Judge Clark agreed with the majority, however,
that it was incorrect to exclude evidence of merit raises and productivity-based increases
under the Penrod rule. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting). Judge Johnson argued vigorously for
adoption of the total offset method. See id. at 317-24 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Finally,
Judge Tjoflat dissented on the ground that the plaintiffs had not preserved the inflation
issue for appeal. Id. at 315 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
101 678 F.2d 453 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982).
102 678 F.2d at 461.
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held the trial judge's attempt to compensate for the effect of infla-
tion by not discounting the award, thus expressly embracing the
rule recently adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.103 In its
analysis of the propriety of the award, the court chose not to com-
pare this "total offset" approach with other possible methods. 04
Instead, the Pfeifer court focused its analysis upon the ability of a
federal court applying federal law to adopt a state standard. 0 5 Af-
ter determining that there was "no jurisprudential impediment" to
the adoption of the Pennsylvania rule, the court reviewed Penn-
sylvania case law on the inflation issue and concluded that "an
honest and accurate calculation must consider the stark reality of
inflationary conditions.' 106 Finally, the Pfeifer court noted with
approval that use of the total offset rule avoided speculation as
well as "'complicated, time consuming economic testimony,'" and
rendered more predictable awards.10 7
Presently, the federal courts appear to take the position that
while inflation should be included in lost future earnings, the suit-
ability of the method employed should be determined on a case-
by-case basis. 108 Given the courts' justifiable concern with balanc-
103 Id. The method adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Kaczkowski v.
Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980), has been referred to as the "total offset"
method, see Pfeifer, 678 F.2d at 461, or the "Alaska Rule," see Culver v. Slater Boat Co.,
688 F.2d 280, 299 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
I" See 678 F.2d at 457-61.
105 See id. at 456.
1* Id. at 458-61.
107 Id. (quoting Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 583, 421 A.2d 1027, 1038 (1980)).
108 E.g., O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1199-1201 (7th Cir. 1982); Doca
v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 34-40 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 971 (1981); Taenzler v. Burlington N., Inc., 608 F.2d 796, 799-801 (8th Cir. 1979). The
only circuit that continues to espouse the traditional rule with respect to inflation is the
First Circuit. See Williams v. United States, 435 F.2d 804, 807 (1st Cir. 1970) (applying
Rhode Island law). In Williams, the First Circuit, interpreting Rhode Island law, held that
future inflation could not be included in determining lost future earnings. Id. at 807. In a
subsequent case, again applying Rhode Island law but which law now included an inflation-
compensation statute, the First Circuit reached a result different than that rendered in Wil-
liams. See Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173, 184-87 (1st Cir. 1974). Thus, it is
uncertain whether the First Circuit would apply the principles used in Williams to a case
decided under federal law.
Although it has yet to rule on the inflation question, the Supreme Court has indicated
several times in dicta that it approves of accounting for inflation in calculating future dam-
ages. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 494 (1980); Grunenthal v. Long
Island, R.R., 393 U.S. 156, 160-61 (1968); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 491
(1916). In Norfolk, the Court considered whether future income tax liability on lost future
earnings should be taken into account in a wrongful death action brought under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act. See id. at 490-91. The Court held that the exclusion of evidence
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ing considerations of equity, certainty, and efficiency in determin-
ing damages, this position appears reasonable.10 9 It is favored by
several economists110 who contend that greater fairness to the
plaintiff will result if detailed information about wage trends in the
plaintiff's specific occupation is used to determine lost future earn-
ings, rather than across-the-board application of a general
formula."11
Serious questions remain, however, concerning the risk of
prejudice posed by economic testimony. One obvious source of
prejudice is the public's tendency to distrust the credibility of eco-
nomic calculations.1 1 2 Furthermore, a jury may be unable to com-
prehend economic presentations.113  The evidentiary approach,
therefore, may leave the plaintiff no better off than if the tradi-
tional rule were still in force. 114 Indeed, the plaintiff may be at a
disadvantage if the jury does not fairly evaluate his economic
demonstrating the impact that income taxes would have had on a decedents lost future
earnings was reversible error. Id. at 494. The Court observed:
[T]here are many variables that may affect the amount of a wage earner's future
income-tax liability... But future employment itself, future health, future per-
sonal expenditures, future interest rates, and future inflation are also matters of
estimate and prediction. Any one of these issues night provide the basis for pro-
tracted expert testimony and debate. But the practical wisdom of the trial bar and
the trial bench has developed effective methods of presenting the essential ele-
ments of an expert calculation in a form that is understandable by juries that are
increasingly familiar with the complexities of modern life.
Id. at 494.
10* See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text. The term "efficiency" will be used in
this Note as it relates to a number of issues concerning the actual conduct of trials, such as
avoidance of wasted time and unwarranted evidence. See, e.g., Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 461 (3d Cir.) (total offset method contributes to "judicial effi-
ciency"), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982); Riha v. Jasper Blackburn Corp., 516 F.2d 840,
843 n.4 (8th Cir. 1975) (evidence of future inflation and tax considerations "will create un-
manageable trials").
110 See Coyne, supra note 7, at 27-28; Fisher & Hartnett, supra note 29, at 79-80;
Lebrenz, supra note 47, at 375; Peck & Hopkins, supra note 2, at 361.
" See, e.g., Taenzler v. Burlington N., Inc., 608 F.2d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 1979); Bach v.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 502 F.2d 1117, 1122 (6th Cir. 1974).
112 See 0. MORGENSTERN, supra note 46, at 9. A problem often mentioned by the courts
is that rather than being doubtful, the jury may accept detailed economic calculations with
too little skepticism. See Taenzler v. Burlington N., Inc., 608 F.2d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 1979).
I' See, e.g., P. SAMUELSON, supra note 8, at 8-9; Fisher, supra note 70, at 410.
114 See, e.g., Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 644 F.2d 460, 464 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds en banc, 688 F.2d 280 (1982). In Culver, the trial judge permitted evidence of
"provable increases" in the decedent's wages up to the date of trial to be considered by the
jury. Id. The jury apparently rejected this evidence, basing the award instead on the dece-
dent's average earnings for the 5-year period preceding his death. Id.
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evidence.11
It is suggested that the federal courts should closely scrutinize
the various methods proposed by economists with a view toward
eventually adopting a uniform inflation calculation rule. Courts
seem disposed to adopt the method of accounting for inflation that
requires the least recourse to economic evidence while producing
reasonably fair and nonspeculative awards.""' With this in mind,
the various proposals espoused by commentators and economists
will be examined briefly.
THE ECONOMISTS' PROPOSALS FOR INCLUDING INFLATION IN
DAMAGES
Several commentators believe that lump-sum compensation
does not adequately compensate a plaintiff in certain cases.1 As
an alternative, they recommend a system of installment pay-
ments.118 The two proposals usually discussed are structured set-
1 See id. at 463. Culver illustrates how a jury's misinterpretation of economic evidence
can lead to substantial injustice. See id. In Culver, the plaintiff submitted no evidence as to
what would constitute a proper discount rate. Id. at 464. The defendant's expert suggested a
rate of 9.125%, the current rate on government bonds. Id. at 463 & n.4. On being instructed
to discount the award "by a percentage that you feel represents an appropriate rate of inter-
est at the present time," the jury chose to discount by 25%. Id. at 463 & nn.2-3. The trial
judge substituted 9.125% in calculating the award, an act the Fifth Circuit held not to be an
abuse of discretion. Id. at 463, 464-65.
" See, e.g., Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280, 308 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc); Doca
v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 40 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 971 (1981). The federal courts have looked most favorably on inflation-compensation
measures that seemed likeliest to provide shortcuts to a fair award. This is illustrated by the
Third Circuit's adoption of the total offset approach in Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 461 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982) and the Second Cir-
cuit's suggestion of a two percent "real rate" discount figure in Doca v. Marina Mercante
Nicaraguense, 634 F.2d 30, 39-40 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981). The concern with
avoiding undue speculation, confusion, and prejudice has led other circuits to develop
equally cautious approaches. See, e.g., Taenzler v. Burlington N., Inc., 608 F.2d 796, 800-02
(8th Cir. 1979); Bach v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 502 F.2d 1117, 1122 (6th Cir. 1974).
1 See Krause, Structured Settlements for Tort Victims, 66 A.B.A. J. 1527, 1527
(1980); Lilly, Alternatives to Lump Sum Payments in Personal Injury Cases, 44 INS.
CouNs. J. 243, 247 (1977). The most often mentioned flaw that commentators find with
lump-sum payments is the possibility that a plaintiff will squander an award or lose it
through mismanagement. See, e.g., Henderson, Restoring the Tort Victim to Pre-Injury
Position: A Goal on Which We Can All Agree, 67 A.B.A. J. 301, 302 (1981).
118 See Lilly, supra note 117, at 247; Sedg'.ck & Judge, The Use of Annuities in Set-
tlement of Personal Injury Cases, 41 INs. COUNS. J. 584, 584 (1974). Most advocates of
installment payments focus upon the importance of avoiding unduly large awards to plain-
tiffs. See, e.g., Elligett, The Periodic Payment of Judgments, 46 INs. CouNs. J. 130, 130
(1979); Krause, supra note 117, at 1527; Sedgwick & Judge, supra, at 584.
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tlements and periodic payment of judgments.
The phrase "structured settlement" is an all-encompassing
term used to describe any settlement that includes a periodic pay-
ment plan tb provide for future expenses of an injured party.119
Because they generally involve "locked in" periodic payments,
structured settlements have been criticized on the ground that
they allow defendants to minimize costs while failing to take into
account the payments' decreasing purchasing power which results
from rising inflation. 120 Since these arrangements are consensual,
however, careful planning on the part of counsel for both parties
can ensure a settlement that is acceptable and beneficial to all.121
A more innovative approach replaces the traditional lump-sum
judgment with a periodic payment of judgment plan. 22 Calculating
119 E.g., Kreindler, Structured 'Lemons', N.Y.L.J., July 20, 1981, at 1, col. 1. Structured
settlements typically feature an annuity to compensate for future damages and lump-sum
payments for accrued expenses. E.g., Lilly, supra note 117, at 243. Several different annui-
ties can be combined in the same settlement. See Krause, supra note 117, at 1528.
120 E.g., Kreindler, supra note 119, at 2, col. 1. Structured settlements are often cheaper
for a defendant-insurance company than a lump-sum award, since it can purchase an annu-
ity for less money than the plaintiff can. Id. at 2, col. 2.
121 Corboy, Structured Injustice: Compulsory Payment of Judgments, 66 A.B.A. J.
1524, 1524 (1980); see, e.g., Krause, supra note 117, at 1528-29; Lilly, supra note 117, at 247;
Sedgwick & Judge, supra note 118, at 587. The defendant can arrange a settlement that
provides for future increases in payments to compensate for inflation while retaining the
advantage of decreased costs. See Kreindler, supra note 119, at 2, col. 1. Opponents of the
structured settlement concept nonetheless concede that there are circumstances in which it
will be to the plaintiff's advantage to make a structured settlement. See id. The key to
arranging a structured settlement that will satisfy both parties lies in making sure that the
plaintiff understands the limitations of such a settlement. See, e.g., id. At any rate, lawyers
and judges will have to learn to think in terms of structuring awards for the plaintiff's long-
range benefits in order to work effectively with structured settlements. Krause, supra note
117, at 1528.
It also has been suggested that increased use of structured settlements will benefit
plaintiffs' attorneys directly by giving them the option of asking for payment from the de-
fendant in annuity form, with its concomitant tax advantages. See Lilly, supra note 117, at
246; Sedgwick & Judge, supra note 118, at 585. But see Grossman & Roman, The Model
Periodic Payment of Judgments Act: An Economic Analysis, TRIAL, May, 1982, at 62, 65
(use of periodic installment legal fees raises serious legal and ethical questions).
122 See, e.g., MODEL PERIODIC PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS ACT § 3, 14 U.L.A. 6 (West Supp.
1982) (the Act). Many states have adopted legislation requiring periodic payments in spe-
cific actions, such as those brought under workers' compensation or no-fault insurance
plans. See Elligett, supra note 118, at 133-34. Approximately one-half of the states have no-
fault automobile insurance legislation, which generally calls for some type of periodic pay-
ment. Id. at 134. Much of this legislation is patterned on the Uniform Motor Vehicle Acci-
dent Reparations Act. Id. at 133-34; see UNi'. MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPARATIONs ACT §
27, 14 U.L.A. 102-03 (1980). For examples of periodic payment provisions in state legisla-
tion, see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-4021 (1980) (monthly payments required); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
627.736(1)(b) (West Supp. 1982) (disability payments must be made "not less than every 2
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present value and future inflation is unnecessary under such a plan
since the payments can be adjusted as they accrue.12 3 Because of
the difficulties in application that have arisen, such as determining
the types of actions in which it should be used,124 there currently is
little enthusiasm for expanded application of this approach. 25
weeks"); N.Y. INS. LAW § 675(1) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983) (payment to be made as loss
accrues). It has been suggested that such plans should be applied in personal injury and
wrongful death cases as well, particularly where large verdicts are probable. See, e.g., El-
ligett, supra note 118, at 134. A number of states have enacted provisions allowing periodic
payments in medical malpractice actions. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 667.7 (West
1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 678.51 (West Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2609 (Supp. 1981).
Periodic payments are advantageous because they eliminate the possibility that the
plaintiff will squander a large lump-sum recovery intended to provide him with lifetime
income. See, e.g., Elligett, supra note 118, at 131; Henderson, supra note 117, at 302;
Sedgwick & Judge, supra note 118, at 584. Similarly, since payments can be terminated if
the plaintiff fails to live out his predicted lifespan, his heirs will not enjoy a windfall. See,
e.g., Elligett, supra note 118, at 140-41. Specific mechanisms proposed for eliminating wind-
falls by terminating future medical benefits and pain and suffering damages on the plain-
tiff's death have drawn strong criticism. See, e.g., Corboy, supra note 121, at 1526; Gross-
man & Roman, supra note 121, at 64.
'23 Present value and inflation considerations are not irrelevant under a periodic pay-
ment plan if the plan does not build inflation increases into future installments, or allow
frequent reevaluation of judgments. The Act, for example, requires future damages to be
computed in current dollars. See MODEL PERIODIC PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS ACT § 5, 14
U.L.A. 9 (West Supp. 1982). Section 7 of the Act provides for adjustments to be made at
yearly intervals, beginning 1 year after the judgment is first entered. See id. § 7. Adjust-
ments are made in the following manner: the base earnings figure is discounted three per-
cent annually, then compounded by the current discount rate on 52-week treasury bills. Id.
§§ 7(c), 10. It has been argued that this method systematically undercompensates the plain-
tiff and thus its enactment would be imprudent. See Grossman & Roman, supra note 121, at
63. Tax complications arise as well, since if the award is invested in treasury bills, as the
drafters suggest, income from it will be taxable. See Corboy, supra note 121, at 1525. Addi-
tionally, this method of compensating for inflation has been found undesirable because it
requires continued judicial involvement. See Krause, supra note 117, at 1529.
'124 See Elligett, supra note 118, at 133-39. Problems with respect to periodic payment
statutes include whether the trial court or the jury should determine the number of years
over which payments should be made, see id. at 138, and whether the consent of one or both
parties should be required, see MODEL PERIODIC PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS ACT § 3(a), 14
U.L.A. 6 (West Supp. 1982).
125 See Corboy, supra note 121, at 1526. No state has adopted the Model Periodic Pay-
ment of Judgments Act, 14 U.L.A. 2 (West Supp. 1982), and at least one commentator ap-
parently believes that the Act will never be successful. See Corboy, supra note 121, at 1526.
Indeed, the designating of the Act a "Model" as opposed to a "Uniform" Act indicates the
drafters' realization that it has little chance of enactment in a significant number of jurisdic-
tions. Id.
Some limited periodic payment schemes have been subject to constitutional challenge.
See, e.g., American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp. of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 163
Cal. Rptr. 513 (Ct. App. 1980); Note, Recent Legislation: the Kansas Approach to Medical
Malpractice, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 395, 418-19 (1977). In American Bank & Trust, the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court's ruling that the California periodic payment
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Despite the shortcomings inherent in lump-sum judgments,
most economists believe that they would provide adequate com-
pensation if inflation were to be factored into them.126 Several
methods have been proposed to accomplish this purpose. 27 Those
most commonly discussed by the commentators, though infre-
quently adopted by the courts, are based essentially upon the
Fisher theory of interest rates.12 8 Under these methods, estimation
of the real rate of interest alone allows the economist to account
for inflation. 129 Since direct economic estimation is required, how-
ever, the problems of credibility and clarity associated with the ev-
identiary approach apply.'30 Additionally, to the extent that the
estimated inflation rate contained in the discount rate lags behind
actual inflation, these methods automatically underestimate infla-
tion,"3 and thus undercompensate the plaintiff. 32
statute violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, since it only ap-
plied to medical malpractice cases. 163 Cal. Rptr. at 516-22.
2 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 20, at 631; Coyne, supra note 7, at 31; Formuzis &
O'Donnell, supra note 40, at 304-05; Franz, supra note 22, at 37; Peck & Hopkins, supra
note 2, at 377.
127 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 20, at 630-31 (allowing the discount rate to offset in-
creases in wages); Coyne, supra note 7, at 29-31 (compounding and then discounting, deriv-
ing all figures from specific information about the plaintiff where practicable); Formuzis &
O'Donnell, supra note 40, at 302 (using the relationship between wage increase rates and
interest rates to predict the wage increase rate).
12s See Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 524 F.2d 384, 388 (2d Cir. 1975). The Feld-
man and English methods are discussed more frequently by courts than by economists. See
Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280, 295-96 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc); Doca v. Marina
Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971
(1981); O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1982).
129 See O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1199-1200 (7th Cir. 1982). The
O'Shea court discussed two methods by which inflation could be accounted for in calculat-
ing lost future earnings. Id. In both of these methods, only estimation of the real rate of
interest is required. See id. The first method, which also was used in Feldman, accounts for
inflation by removing the inflation component from the discount rate. Id. This is accom-
plished by discounting the award with the real rate of interest, which by definition does not
contain an inflation component. Id. at 1199. This lower discount rate results in a larger final
award. The second meth6d uses the real rate of interest to estimate the inflation rate. Id.
The real rate is subtracted from the discount rate. Id. The resulting figure is used to com-
pound base annual earnings before applying the discount rate. Id. Both of these methods
are based on the assumption that the discount rate contains an inflation factor. Id.
120 See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
"' See, e.g., I. FiSHER, supra note 27, at 43; Hazlitt, Inflation and Interest Rates, 27
FREEMAN 213, 216 (1977); McCracken, Interest Rate Forecasting ... and Other Popular
Delusions, 159 BANKERS MAG. 71, 74 (1976). Since the Fisher theory implicitly assumes that
the real rate of interest remains stable over time, an estimation problem arises if this stabil-
ity does not in fact occur. The validity of the stable real rate assumption continues to be a
source of controversy among economists. Gibson, Interest Rates and Inflationary Expecta-
tions: New Evidence, 62 Am. ECON. REV. 854, 854 (1972). Many economists support the
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Two other inflation-compensation suggestions avoid the evi-
dentiary problems inherent in predicting either the real rate or the
future inflation rate. The first method, devised by Professors
Formuzis and O'Donnell, is based upon the hypothesis that there
is a constant relationship between the discount rate and the na-
tional rate of wage growth. 13 3 By applying regression analysis T1 4 to
3-year moving averages 3 5 of interest rates and wage-growth rates
theory that the real rate fluctuates. See, e.g., Carlson, Short-Term Interest Rates as
Predictors of Inflation: A Comment, 67 AM. EcoN. REv. 469, 469 (1977). But see Fama,
Interest Rates and Inflation: The Message in the Entrails, 67 Am. EcON. REv. 487, 496
(1977) (real rate may fluctuate, but its variation reflects changes in the inflation rate); Gib-
son, supra, at 863 (real rate conbtant for short-term interest rates). In view of this uncer-
tainty concerning the behavior of the real rate, it would appear less speculative to base
predictions concerning wage and price increases on the relationship that these factors bear
to the discount rate. See Formuzis & O'Donnell, supra note 40, at 299. The existence of a
predictable relationship between wage increase rates and interest rates is uncontroverted.
See, e.g., Franz, supra note 22, at 36.
132 See Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280, 302 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
133 Formuzis & O'Donnell, supra note 40, at 299.
I Regression analysis, as the term is used in econometrics, is defined as "a method for
predicting the value of a dependent variable from known values of independent variables."
C. AMMER & D. AMMER, DICTIONARY OF BusiNEss AND EcONoMics 358 (1977). For a brief
summary of how regression analysis operates, see infra text accompanying notes 134-43.
135 A moving average is defined as:
[A] series of calculations made by taking the simple average or arithmetic mean,
of a consecutive number of items, then discarding the first item and adding the
first of the remaining items, and continuing the pfocess, so that the number of
items in the series remains constant.
C. AMMER & D. AMMER, supra note 134, at 278; cf. Formuzis & O'Donnell, supra note 40, at
300 n.14 (defining moving average as taken for 1 year only). Moving averages are calculated
using successive, equal-sized clusters of observations. The process can best be demonstrated
by means of a simple example:
Observations Moving Averages
1
1.5
2
'2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5.
5.5
6
For a similar illustration, see C. AMMER & D. AMEaR, supra note 134, at 278.
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using data for a 20-year period,136 they discovered that the wage
increase rate consistently exceeded the rate of discount by 1.4% .17
Using this result, they devised the following procedure to factor
inflation into lost future earnings: the discount rate is increased by
1.4 to produce an estimated rate of wage increase;138 base annual
earnings then are compounded by this estimated rate prior to
discounting. 39
This method presents clear advantages. Not only is it simple
to explain and apply, but it also lends itself to the formulation of
an inflation-accounting rule which could be incorporated easily
into the existing discounting rule accepted by the courts.140 Fur-
thermore, by eliminating the need for testimony concerning the in-
flation rate, a possible source of confusion and prejudice is elimi-
nated." According to its formulators, the method's accuracy was
affirmed by a statistical test 142 and its efficiency has been demon-
strated in trial courts. 3
The final method of accounting for inflation's impact, promul-
136 See Formuzis & O'Donnell, supra note 40, at 300-02.
137 Id. at 302.
238 Id.
139 See id. Professors Formuzis and O'Donnell do not explain that the estimate of the
wage increase rate obtained by their method is then used to compound lost future earnings,
as pointed out by Professor Franz, who tested the same method. See Franz, supra note 22,
at 36-37.
140 In the past, several courts have favored the adoption of a fixed numerical value to
aid in damages calculations. See, e.g., Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634
F.2d 30, 40 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981) (approving the standardization
of a two percent "real" discount rate) (dictum); Brodie v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 415 Pa.
296, 300, 203 A.2d 657, 659 (1964) (citing Pennsylvania's mandatory 6% rule).
141 Franz, supra note 22, at 37; Sherman, supra note 20, at 733; Note, Loss of Future
Earnings: Present Worth Versus Wage Growth, 35 MoNT. L. Rlv. 354, 360 (1974); Note,
supra note 10, at 127; see Carlson, supra note 20, at 629.
142 See Formuzis & O'Donnell, supra note 40, at 304-05.
143 See id. at 305. Although Professors Formuzis and O'Donnell claim that their method
has been used successfully by trial courts in California, Colorado, Montana, Washington,
and the Dakotas, they give no support for this claim. See id.
There are indications that state courts, while willing to compensate a plaintiff for the
effects of future inflation, may be less willing to embrace economic estimates based on unar-
ticulated assumptions. See, e.g., Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466, 483-85, 341
A.2d 613, 622 (1975); Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 583-84, 421 A.2d 1027, 1038-39
(1980). The Tenore court refused to admit tables containing aggregated estimates of the
plaintiff's total damages for two reasons. 67 N.J. at 482, 341 A.2d at 622. First, the estimates
were based upon assumptions as to the decedents future earnings capacity and personal
expenses that the economist should not have made. Id. The second ground for rejection of
the tables stemmed from the court's belief that presentation of estimates to the jury denied
it the opportunity to evaluate the assumptions underlying these estimates and was thus
unduly prejudicial. Id. at 483-84, 341 A.2d at 622.
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gated by Professor Carlson, eschews calculations altogether. Unlike
most of his colleagues, Professor Carlson contends that it is possi-
ble to compensate a plaintiff adequately for the impact of inflation
upon lost future earnings by eliminating the discounting process. "
This approach also is simple to explain and apply since it requires
presentation of little economic evidence. 14 5 Moreover, because it
requires that only one assumption be made-that the discount rate
equals the wage increase rate-this method involves less specula-
tion than the Formuzis and O'Donnell approach.1 41 In addition,
awards based on the Carlson method would be predictable and
thus would tend to encourage settlements. 4 7 Professor Carlson's
144 See Carlson, supra note 20, at 630-31. A small number of economists support Pro-
fessor Carlson's approach. See Franz, supra note 22, at 37 (Carlson method preferred over
the Formuzis/O'Donnell method for courtroom use); Sherman, supra note 20, at 733.
Professor Carlson's assumption that the impact of the wage increase rate and the dis-
count rate cancel out hinges on the nature of the compounding and discounting processes.
See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 20, at 629; Franz, supra note 22, at 37. These processes are
arithmetical inverses of each other as can easily be demonstrated. Let X equal the amount
of base earnings. If X is first compounded by (1 + i), the discounting process produces the
following results:
Present value of X (1 + i) + X (1 + i) 1
(1 + i)
- X (1 + i)
(1 + i)
-X
See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 8, at 615 n.4; supra note 19.
145 See, e.g., Franz, supra note 22, at 37.
11 See, e.g., Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 461 (3d Cir.), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982). Professor Carlson applies his offset method to wage gains
resulting from productivity increases as well as those due to inflation. Carlson, supra note
20, at 631. His rationale for this appears to be that since current national productivity
trends are low and presently show a tendency to decline, it is fair to assume the plaintiff's
annual productivity increase to be zero if he is representative of his occupation. Id. In such
an economic climate, the real rate of return on an investment-the appropriate discount
rate for this situation-should behave similarly. Id. Offsetting productivity increase rates
against the rate of return on investment, therefore, is reasonable. Id. Professors Formuzis
and O'Donnell suggest that this assumption produces the proper result, but for a different
reason. Productivity, they contend, is built into wage growth rates just as the real rate is
built into the discount rate. Formuzis & O'Donnell, supra note 40, at 299-300. Inflation is
the other component of both rates. Id. at 300. Thus, the difference between the rate of wage
growth and the rate of interest is a direct reflection of the difference between the rate of
increase in productivity and the rate of return on capital. Id.
141 See, e.g., Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 571, 421 A.2d 1027, 1038 (1980).
Predictability of the size of the award is no insignificant benefit when one recalls that the
plaintiff has the option of negotiating for a structured settlement if it appears that the court
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method has been disapproved of, however, on the ground that it
consistently underestimates the impact of inflation upon the plain-
tiff's award.14 Since there is a stable nonzero differential between
wage increases and discount rates, 149 the Carlson method necessa-
rily undercompensates for inflation to the extent of this differ-
ence.150 Clearly, a rule that attempts to estimate this difference is
fairer than one that ignores it. It is submitted, therefore, that the
federal courts should adopt the Formuzis/O'Donnell method as a
matter of law. While estimates of the wage increase/discount rate
differential vary, these estimates cluster near the 1.4% figure that
Professors Formuzis and O'Donnell discovered.' 5' Thus, the
amount of error in the final award would be slight by comparison
with the Carlson method, which assumes that no difference exists.
Indeed, it is as unreasonable to refuse to estimate this difference as
it would be to refuse to account for inflation at all. 52 Furthermore,
this approach retains the simplicity and efficiency advantages of
the Carlson method. If adopted with the understanding that future
changes in the American economy may require adjustment in the
differential used, it would appear that the Formuzis/O'Donnell ap-
proach offers a better balance of equity, certainty, and efficiency
than any of the other methods proposed.
award might be inadequate. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
1, See, e.g., Steckler v. United States, 549 F.2d 1372, 1377-78 (10th Cir. 1977); United
States v. English, 521 F.2d 63, 73-75 (9th Cir. 1975); Coyne, supra noe 7, at 31; Formuzis &
O'Donnell, supra note 40, at 303-04; Lipnowski, supra note 7, at 331; Maher, Estimating
Future Earnings Loss: Misinterpretation and Faulty Logic, TRIAL, Feb., 1979, at 39, 41;
Ward, supra note 7, at 63.
"9 Formuzis & O'Donnell, supra note 40, at 299; Franz, supra note 22, at 36.
150 See Formuzis & O'Donnell, supra note 40, at 302-03. If the wage increase exceeds
the discount rate used to calculate the lost earnings by one to two percent, that amount of
annual wage increase will not be factored into the award. See id.
1'1 See Franz, supra note 22, at 36. Professor Franz only indicated that the wage in-
crease/discount rate differential was "over 1%." Id. Professor Coyne found a 1.6% differen-
tial. Coyne, supra note 7, at 26. Neither of these estimates is substantially different from the
Formuzis/O'Donnell 1.4% figure. See Formuzis & O'Donnell, supra note 40, at 302.
182 See, e.g., Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280, 294-95 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc);
O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1200 (7th Cir. 1982); Doca v. Marina Mer-
cante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971
(1981). Several federal courts have observed that inflation is so much a part of American
economic reality that it is unreasonable to refuse to estimate its effect on awards merely
because making such an estimate requires speculation. E.g., Doca v. Marina Mercante Ni-
carguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 37 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981). Similarly,
choosing a simple but inaccurate estimation method is unreasonable if more accurate and
equally simple methods exist. See Coyne, supra note 7, at 25.
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CONCLUSION
A number of approaches have been devised to incorporate the
impact of inflation into lost future earnings calculations. While all
of these proposals provide the plaintiff with fairer compensation
than the traditional procedure, courts quite properly have not ac-
cepted any method without determining how well it comports with
the policy considerations of equity, certainty, and efficiency. Econ-
omists, who presumably are best qualified to judge the accuracy of
economic prediction methods, have been slow to evaluate the com-
peting proposals. 1"5 While a number of courts have attempted to
perform such an evaluation, they arguably have neither the time
nor the expertise for such a task.1"
Thus far, the federal courts have admitted evidence of infla-
tion rates, but have hesitated to lay down a fixed rule to use in
damage calculations. This approach, though fair, is impractical.
The method proposed by Professors Formuzis and O'Donnell, how-
""3 Articles recently published by economists on the topic of future inflation's impact
on damages generally have been aimed at persuading the reader of the practicality and ac-
curacy of the method advocated by the author. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 20, at 628;
Formuzis & O'Donnell, supra note 40, at 305; Sherman, supra note 20, at 723. Those articles
that do not take a partisan approach often merely review factors that should be taken into
account in damage computations. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 8, at 308; Peck & Hop-
kins, supra note 2, at 377. Economists who have chosen to discuss approaches used by their
colleagues often do not attempt to be comprehensive. See Coyne, supra note 7, at 27-28;
Maher, supra note 148, at 39.
A study comparing the results produced by all of the calculation methods previously
discussed would be a valuable contribution to the literature on this topic. One possible ap-
proach is that used by Professors Formuzis and O'Donnell in testing their hypothesis.
Twenty random "accident" dates were selected between 1955 and 1975. Formuzis &
O'Donnell, supra note 40, at 304. It was assumed that each plaintiff was deprived com-
pletely of future earning capacity, and that the worklife of each would end in 1975. See id.
Using the interest rate available on short-term government securities on the date of the
"accident" as the discount rate, "awards" were calculated. Id. The amounts of these
"awards" were then compared with actual interest rates and earnings. Id. Such a study,
done on a larger number of awards and comparing a number of different methods, would
allow for a more reliable evaluation of the fairness of each method.
1 The burdensome caseload with which the American judicial system struggles is un-
disputed. See, e.g., Meador, The Federal Judiciary-Inflation, Malfunction, and a Pro-
posed Course of Action, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 617, 618-20 (federal court statistics); Flango &
Blair, Creating an Intermediate Appellate Court: Does It Reduce the Caseload of a State's
Highest Court?, 64 JUDMATURE 75, 75 (1980) (statistics concerning state appellate courts). It
also should be remembered that judges usually are not economic experts. See Plourd v.
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 266 Or. 666, 513 P.2d 1140, 1145 (1973). Nor can a busy judge be
certain that counsel will alleviate his ignorance of this technical field with expert testimony.
See Fisher, supra note 70, at 403. One reason for this simply may be uncertainty as to how
to use such testimony advantageously. See Ward, supra note 7, at 60.
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ever, is simple as well as fair, and avoids the efficiency and cer-
tainty problems posed by other methods. This method, which pro-
vides a reasonable balance of the relevant policy concerns,
constitutes the best option available to the courts.
Catherine C. Olanich
